The Knowledge Bank and Poverty Reduction by Nora Lustig
Tulane Economics Working Paper Series









The World Banks (WB) mission and overarching goal is to reduce poverty. Moving ahead, what can the
WB do to enhance its contribution to the poverty reduction agenda? This question can be answered
from at least two perspectives: the WB as a lending institution and the WB as a knowledge bank.
This article will concentrate on the latter and suggest two areas in which more and better information
and analysis could help move the poverty reduction agenda forward: improving data on poverty and
redressing poverty assessments to include the impact of scal policy on poverty and inequality.
Keywords: poverty data, errors, gaps, inconsistencies
JEL: O10  1 




February 10, 2011 
 
The World Bank’s (WB) mission and overarching goal is to reduce poverty. Moving ahead, what can 
the WB do to enhance its contribution to the poverty reduction agenda? This question can be 
answered from at least two perspectives: the WB as a lending institution and the WB as a knowledge 
bank.  Here  we  will  concentrate  on  the  latter  and  suggest  two  areas  in  which  more  and  better 
information and analysis could help move the poverty reduction agenda forward: improving data on 
poverty and redressing poverty assessments to include the impact of fiscal policy on poverty and 
inequality.  
Poverty Data: Errors, Gaps and Inconsistencies 
The WB’s mission statement begins with the following sentence: “Our dream is a world free of 
poverty.” To determine how close --or how far-- we are from achieving this dream we need to have 
accurate measures of poverty and its evolution. With the WB’s (and other multilateral organizations’ 
and donors’) support, much progress has been made towards generating reliable and comparable 
poverty estimates.
3 Yet, the data on poverty is still fraught with problems. Recently, for example, as a 
result of the collection of new price data by the International Comparisons Project, using the new 
2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) conversion factors, we found that the absolute number of poor 
(i.e., people living below the “dollar-a-day” --US$1.25 PPP per day-- poverty line) was 50% higher 
using 2005 PPP conversion factors than the same figure using 1993 PPP conversion factors (Chen 
and Ravallion, 2008; also see Figure 1). Until the new collection of price data was completed, we 
thought there were 931.3 million poor people in 2005 (17.2 percent of total world population). 
However, with the new PPPs, the number rose to 1,399.6 million (28.7 percent of total world 
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population) (Chen and Ravallion, table 5).
4 This large discrepancy between estimates using 1993 and 
2005 conversion factors stemmed “… in large part from biases in prior rounds of the price surveys 
that were used to estimate the PPP exchange rates used for currency conversions” (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2008, p. 3). In particular, the 1993 price data grossly under-estimated the cost-of-living in 
a number of developing countries (notably, China and India). As a consequence, incomes were over-
estimated and poverty was under-estimated (both because the previous US$1.08 PPP per day 
poverty line was too low and incomes were overestimated). While the use of more accurate price 
data did not change our likelihood of achieving the first goal
5 of the United Nations’ (UN) 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) --that is, to “halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day”
6-- it put the absolute number of poor in 
2005 at levels that we thought prevailed in the early 1980s. In other words, with a more accurate 
measure of the cost-of-living in developing countries we regressed 25 years in terms of how many 
people in the world need to be lifted out of poverty for the WB’s dream to come true.    
Figure 1. World number of poor using 1993 and 2005 price data for purchasing power conversions 
 
Source: Data from Chen and Ravallion (2008). 
                                                 
4 Fortunately, the trend did not change: the pace at which poverty has been falling in the last 15 years using the 2005 
PPP conversion factors has been similar to the pace using the 1993 PPP conversion factors. 
5 Strictly speaking it is the first target of the first goal. See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml  
6 The MDGs can be found at this webpage: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.  Specifically, the first goal can be 
found at this webpage: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml.     3 
As troublesome as the above is, it is just one of the problems we face in generating accurate 
estimates of poverty and its evolution for the developing world. In many countries, especially the 
poorest ones, data is scant or non-existent. As can be seen in Figure 2, in 57 countries (over a third 
of developing countries) there are zero or only one data point between 1990 and 2010. This makes it 
impossible to track progress towards the achievement of the first goal of the MDGs.    
Figure 2. Number of countries with number of observations between 1990-2010 and 2000-2010 
 
Source: Author’s estimates based on PovcalNet. 
Since the signing of the Millennium Declaration by 189 member states in September 2000, the 
MDGs  have  emerged  as  a  key  development  monitoring  and  planning  tool  for  countries  and 
international agencies. As we approach the endpoint of the MDGs in 2015, we should be able to 
compare observed progress against the MDG baseline from 1990, in particular for the very first 
goal. Minimally consistent and reliable country level data are essential if poverty reduction goals are 
to be both policy drivers and benchmarks for development outcomes. In spite of the great progress 
made,
7 a survey of data availability and quality (Lustig, 2008) found that even in the case of an 
indicator as basic as the headcount ratio, close to half of the 149 developing countries did not have 
sufficient information in the UN Statistics Division (UNSD) database
8 to monitor progress (i.e., did 
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8 The UNSD (United Nation Statistical Division) database uses the WB’s World Development Indicators.   4 
not  have  at  least  two  points  in  time  for  the  period  1990-2006)  (see  Table  1).  This  problem  is 
compounded because there are many countries in which data for at least two points of time does 
exist, but comes from surveys that are not comparable over time.  
Table 1. Data Availability for Headcount Ratios among 149 Developing Countries: 1990-2006 
  International Poverty Line 
Number of Countries 
National Poverty Line 
Number of Countries 
1. NO DATA  54  68 
2. NOT POSSIBLE  14  30 
3. LIMITED  5  21 
4. ADEQUATE  24  26 
5. IDEAL  52  4 
TOTAL  149  149 
Source: Lustig (2007). 
Note: In order to assess the availability of data we have used the following taxonomy: 1. NO DATA: no data reported in 
the UNSD database; 2. NOT POSSIBLE: there is only one data point; 3. LIMITED: there are at least two points but 
they are four years or less apart; 4. ADEQUATE: there are at least two data points that are five years or more apart; 5. 
IDEAL: there are at least two data points with one prior to 1995 and one after 2000. 
 
A third issue arises because in a non-trivial number of cases, the levels and trends reported by 
different sources (such as the country MDG reports, UN Economic Commissions’ reports and 
statistical database, and the WB’s poverty assessments) are not consistent with each other or with 
those found in PovcalNet: the on-line tool for poverty measures developed by the Development 
Research Group of the WB,
9 which is a widely used source. Differences in poverty estimates should 
not be surprising since there are a number of legitimate factors that can affect poverty numbers. To 
name the most important: whether data is corrected for under-reporting; whether calculations are 
made using the microdata (e.g., household surveys) or grouped data; whether the welfare indicator is 
income or consumption, and whether it is expressed in per capita or equivalized units; whether non-
monetary income sources are included; and, of course, which poverty line is used and how it is 
adjusted over time.  If we could identify the causes of discrepancies and inconsistencies, we would 
be able to choose among sources based on our preferences and needs. The problem is that one 
often cannot determine the cause of the differences because the methodological documentation that 
                                                 
9 More information, instructions on how to use, and access to PovcalNet: the on-line tool for poverty measurement 
developed by the Development Research Group of the WB can be found at http://go.worldbank.org/WE8P1I8250   5 
accompanies  the  published  data  does  not  exist,  does  not  cover  the  issues  that  could  explain 
discrepancies and inconsistencies, or, when it does, the explanations are insufficient.  
There are many examples that poverty levels and trends are not consistent across sources, including 
sources within the WB itself, and in which the WB is a partner. For example, Lustig (2007) found 
that there were 17 out of 38 cases with data in which the trends in UNSD data did not coincide with 
the trends in country MDG reports.
10 For Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the results 
obtained through the WB’s PovcalNet frequently differ from those published by SEDLAC (Socio-
Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean),
11 despite the fact that the latter is a joint 
project with the WB’s LAC poverty group (LCSPP). Let us illustrate this issue with an example for 
Brazil. If you try to show the evolution of poverty for Brazil during the early 1990s crisis, you are 
likely to find what is shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Poverty Headcount Ratio in Brazil for 1990-1993 using $2.50 PPP per day poverty line 
 
Source: PovcalNet data is from http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povcalNet.html, using a poverty line of $2.50 
PPP per day ($76 PPP monthly) using the default 2005 PPP conversion factor for Brazil. SEDLAC data is from 
SEDLAC’s data website and can be obtained either by using a $2.50 PPP per day poverty line in SEDLAC Dynamic 
Searches (http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/dynamics-searches.php) or from the following online document: 
http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/download.php?file=archivos_estadistica/poverty_LAC_2011.xls. 
Note: Data for the year 1991 is not available because the household survey was not conducted that year. 
 
According to the WB’s PovcalNet, the percentage of the population living below the $2.50 PPP per 
day poverty line decreased by 3.6 percentage points between 1990 and 1992 despite the crisis. The 
poverty headcount ratio also decreased between 1990 and 1992 according to SEDLAC (using the 
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same poverty line), but by a much smaller magnitude (only 0.3 percentage points). Between 1992 
and 1993, when Brazil was pulling out of its crisis, the two sources disagree on the direction of 
poverty: PovcalNet reports an increase of 0.4 percentage points, while SEDLAC reports a decrease 
of 0.4 percentage points. The two sources also disagree somewhat on the magnitude of poverty; 
SEDLAC  reports  higher  levels  of  poverty  for  all  three  years.  However,  this  discrepancy  in 
magnitude is not consistent over time (i.e., one source does not report consistently higher levels of 
poverty due to a specific methodological choice); Figure 4 shows that PovcalNet reports higher 
levels of poverty than SEDLAC for 1981-1987 and for 1995-2006, while SEDLAC reports higher 
levels for 1988-1993 and 2007 (the most recent year for which data is available from both sources). 
The two sources disagree on the year-to-year trend of poverty (i.e., whether poverty increased or 
decreased from the previous year) for 1982, 1984, 1993 and 2001. They also frequently disagree on 
the trends of poverty over longer periods of time. Suppose, for example, we are curious about the 
evolution of poverty over the 1980s decade—when Brazil, as most of Latin America, was in the 
midst of a debt crisis. According to PovcalNet, the percentage of the population living on less than 
$2.50 PPP per day decreased between 1981 and 1990; according to SEDLAC, the same figure 
increased (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Poverty Headcount Ratio in Brazil for 1981-2007 using $2.50 PPP per day poverty line 
 
Source: PovcalNet data is from http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povcalNet.html, using a poverty line of $2.50 
PPP per day ($76 PPP monthly) using the default 2005 PPP conversion factor for Brazil. SEDLAC data is from   7 
SEDLAC’s data website and can be obtained either by using a $2.50 PPP per day poverty line in SEDLAC Dynamic 
Searches (http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/dynamics-searches.php) or from the following online document: 
http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/download.php?file=archivos_estadistica/poverty_LAC_2011.xls. 
Note: Data for the years 1991, 1994 and 2000 is not available because the household survey was not conducted those 
years. 
 
For  most  countries,  PovcalNet  data  aligns  with  poverty  data  reported  in  the  WB’s  World 
Development Indicators (WDI);
12 the WDI website even cites PovcalNet’s methodology for poverty 
calculations.
13 However, there are a number of cases in which data is provided in a different manner 
in the two sources, even for the highly-watched “BRIC” or HIPC countries. For countries such as 
India and China, where separate surveys are carried out in urban and rural areas, PovcalNet reports 
two separate sets of poverty figures (one for urban China and one for rural China, for example), 
whereas WDI only reports national poverty figures by calculating a weighted average of the urban 
and rural estimates when perhaps this aggregation is not valid. In addition, there are a number of 
years for which data is reported in one source but not the other. Table 2 illustrates this example for 
the  poverty  headcount  ratio  in  China  and  Indonesia  since  1990.  The  example  of  Indonesia  is 
particularly striking; there is only one year (2005) for which a headcount ratio is reported in both 
WDI and PovcalNet. For 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002, urban and rural headcount ratios are 
reported in PovcalNet, so the necessary data should be available to estimate the national headcount 
ratio for those years in WDI. For 2007, a poverty headcount ratio is reported in WDI but not in 
PovcalNet. These and other discrepancies in data availability should be corrected, or an explanation 
should be documented if they occur for a specific reason. 
Table 2. Poverty Headcount Ratios in China and Indonesia for 1990-2007 using $1.25 PPP per day 
                                                 
12 The World Development Indicators (WDI) can be accessed online at http://databank.worldbank.org/. WDI provides 
poverty data using international poverty lines of $1.25 PPP per day and $2 PPP per day, as well as official national 
poverty lines. PovcalNet data generally aligns with WDI data when the same international poverty lines ($38 per month 
and $60.84 per month, respectively) are put into PovcalNet. 
13 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY 
Year 
China  Indonesia 
WDI  PovcalNet  WDI  PovcalNet 
National  Urban  Rural  National  Urban  Rural 
1990  60.2  23.4  74.1    47.8  57.1 
1992    12.1  84.9       
1993  53.7  14.3  70.4    47.0  58.1 
1994    12.6  79.3       
1995    9.0  74.7       
1996  36.4  8.9  49.5    37.6  46.7 
1997    8.4  66.6       
1998    8.4  67.7         8 
Source: PovcalNet data is from http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povcalNet.html, using a poverty line of $1.25 
PPP per day ($38 PPP monthly) and the default 2005 PPP conversion factors for China and Indonesia. WDI data is 
from http://databank.worldbank.org/ using the series “Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of 
population)”. 
Note: Gray cells indicate that data was not available. Years for which neither country had available data in either source 
are not included in the table. 
 
There are also a number of countries for which the WB’s Poverty Assessments and poverty data 
obtained from the WB’s PovcalNet differ in both the levels and trends of poverty. This is illustrated 
by the following example from Zambia. The data compared in Figure 5 is data from the WB’s 
Zambia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment which used a $.50 PPP per day (World Bank, 2007)
14 
and data obtained from PovcalNet using a poverty line of $1.25 PPP per day.
15 
Figure 5. Poverty Headcount Ratio in Zambia for available years of 1991-2004 
 
Source: PovcalNet data is from http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povcalNet.html, using a poverty line of $1.25 
PPP per day ($38 PPP monthly) using the default 2005 PPP conversion factor for Zambia. Poverty Assessment data is 
from the WB’s Zambia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment (World Bank, 2007, p. 44, Figure 2.8). The same data is 
                                                 
14 The data in the Poverty Assessment (World Bank, 2007, p. 44, Figure 2.8) is cited from Zambia’s Central Statistical 
Office (CSO; see http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/lcm.php) and was not calculated by the authors of the report. 
Nevertheless, the document describes the methodology used by the CSO (in the Annex to Chapter 2). The authors of 
the report only calculate their own figures for poverty in 2002, based on the survey for that year. However, that survey 
was not comparable with other years due to changes in data collection methods (World Bank, 2007). 
15 The $1.25 PPP per day poverty line is tied to what poverty means in the world’s poorest countries (Ravallion, Chen 
and Sangraula, 2009), and is therefore appropriate for measuring poverty in Zambia. In the earlier example of Brazil, a 
$2.50 PPP per day poverty line, which is approximately equal to the median of the official extreme poverty lines 
calculated by LAC governments (usually using a cost of basic needs method), was more appropriate (CEDLAS and the 
World Bank, 2010). 
1999  35.6  7.1  50.9    39.4  53.4 
2002  28.4  3.0  43.7    24.2  33.6 
2005  15.9  1.7  26.1  21.4  18.7  24.0 
2007        29.4       9 
cited in Zambia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (International Monetary Fund, 2007, p. 12, Figure 2.1). The original 
data source is Zambia’s Central Statistical Office (see http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/lcm.php). 
Note:  The  household  surveys  conducted  in  1991,  1993,  1996,  1998  and  2004  are  comparable.  A  survey  was  also 
conducted in 2002, but due to changes in data collection methods, the 2002 survey is not comparable with the other 
years (World Bank, 2007). 
 
While  the  two  data  sources  agree  on  trends  for  1991-1993  and  1993-1996,  there  is  a  large 
disagreement  regarding  the  evolution  of  poverty  between  1996  and  2004.  For  1996-1998,  the 
Poverty Assessment shows an increase in poverty of four percentage points, while PovcalNet shows 
a decrease of seven percentage points. Because the percentage of Zambians living below in poverty 
was already lower according to PovcalNet (using a $1.25 PPP per day line) than according to the 
Poverty Assessment, the decrease reported by PovcalNet for the period 1996-1998 also results in a 
large difference in magnitude between the two sources in 1998: the Poverty Assessment reports an 
incidence of poverty of 73%, while PovcalNet reports 55% (although the poverty line is reportedly 
higher in the latter). The trend for 1998-2004 is also a point of disagreement between the two 
sources, with the Poverty Assessment showing a decrease of five percentage points and PovcalNet 
showing an increase of nine percentage points. Even if we treat 1998 as an “outlier” and discard that 
data point, the two sources disagree on the overall change in poverty between 1996 and 2004: the 
Poverty Assessment reports a slight decrease, while PovcalNet reports a slight increase (see Figure 
5).
16 
As  mentioned  earlier,  it  is  often  difficult  to  identify  the  causes  of  observed  discrepancies  and 
inconsistencies (such as those from the above examples) because the methodological documentation 
that accompanies published data or online estimators does not exist, does not cover the issues that 
could explain discrepancies and inconsistencies, or, when it does, the explanations are insufficient. 
The level of methodological documentation varies among data sources, and one of the areas in 
which the WB can improve the knowledge bank of poverty data would be to add a comprehensive 
methodological guide to the PovcalNet website. Currently, PovcalNet’s methodology for calculating 
poverty  using  parameterized  Lorenz  curves  and  purchasing  power  conversion  factors  is  well-
described on the website, but its methodology regarding other issues inherent in poverty analysis, 
such  as  adjustments  for  underreporting,  adult  equivalence  and  economies  of  scale  within 
households, is difficult to determine. For example, to figure out whether PovcalNet adjusts for adult 
                                                 
16 It is worth noting that the choice of a poverty line (among reasonable poverty lines) does not affect the trends of 
poverty in Zambia for the period 1996-2004 as reported by PovcalNet. Poverty decreased from 1996 to 1998, increased 
from 1998 to 2004, and increased slightly overall between 1996 and 2004 according to PovcalNet, regardless of whether 
the chosen poverty line is $1 PPP, $1.25 PPP, $2 PPP, $2.50 PPP or $2.90 PPP per day. The five poverty lines tested 
were chosen based on Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula (2009).   10 
equivalence, a user might read the background paper provided on PovcalNet’s website: Chen and 
Ravallion (2008). However, this background paper does not explicitly discuss its methodology with 
respect to equivalence scales; instead, it references the methodology of previous papers (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2001, 2004, 2007). To determine PovcalNet’s methodology regarding adjusting for survey 
nonresponse, a user would have to sort through the numerous publications listed on PovcalNet’s 
website, find the article “An Econometric Method of Correcting for Unit Nonresponse Bias in 
Surveys” (Korinek, Mistiam and Ravallion, 2005), and infer that the methodology described in that 
paper is the same methodology adopted by PovcalNet, which is not explicit. It would be useful, 
therefore, to combine PovcalNet’s methodological choices into a comprehensive methodological 
guide easily accessible from its website. The need for such a guide is even more apparent when one 
takes into consideration that the definition of the poverty headcount ratio on the WB’s World 
Development  Indicators  website  says,  “For  more  information  and  methodology,  please  see 
PovcalNet,” and provides a link to the latter.
17  
The WB’s Poverty Assessments typically include a description of the methodology used to estimate 
poverty.  In  the  case  of  Zambia,  the  assessment  includes  a  very  detailed  description  of  the 
methodology used by the authors to calculate a poverty line and various poverty measures in 2002, 
as well as an equally detailed description of the methodology used by Zambia’s Central Statistical 
Office. Likewise, SEDLAC has published (and regularly updates) a detailed methodological guide.
18 
The guide describes SEDLAC’s methodological choices regarding adjustments for zero and missing 
incomes,  under-reporting,  equivalence  scales,  implicit  rent  from  own  housing,  etc.  A  potential 
improvement to this guide would be to include explanations of the effects that these methodological 
choices  have  on  poverty  estimates,  which  would  facilitate  the  process  of  comparing  the  data 
reported by different sources and choosing a source, depending on one’s needs and preferences, to 
analyze poverty in a particular country. 
How often do problems of data consistency, like those described in the above examples, arise? 
Furthermore, why are they relevant?  Experience indicates that inconsistencies in poverty trends 
among different data sources are not an uncommon phenomenon. When inconsistencies occur, it 
becomes  difficult  to  answer  very  straightforward  questions,  such  as  what  happened  to  poverty 
during a particular period.  In the examples presented above, knowing the impact of the early 1990s 
crisis on poverty in Brazil is relevant not just for Brazil but for our analysis of the impact of crises 
                                                 
17 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY 
18 Available from SEDLAC’s website at http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/methodology.php   11 
on  poverty  more  generally.  The  recent  evolution  of  poverty  in  Zambia  is  relevant  not  just  for 
Zambia but for our analysis of poverty in highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) more broadly. In 
addition, since many cross-country empirical studies rely on these indicators and usually use a limited 
number of countries or years, the results of such studies can sometimes be driven by which source 
was used. 
In addition to the issues of gross measurement errors, data gaps and inconsistencies, government-
imposed barriers to microdata access (i.e., to the surveys themselves) are still too common.  This 
inhibits  cross-checking  by  independent  observers  such  as  researchers  and  non-governmental 
organizations.
19 
The previous discussion indicates that poverty data to monitor progress has significant limitations 
despite the enormous progress in the past twenty-five years.  In general, these limitations are not 
caused  by  a  particular  institution  or  by  individuals  representing  a  country  or  by  staff  in  the 
multilateral organization who are doing quite an heroic task to generate and publish information on 
poverty on a regular basis for as many countries as possible.  However, the WB could assume a 
leadership  role  in  addressing  these  limitations  by  making  the  production  of  nearly  universally 
comparable and consistent poverty data a key strategic goal.
20 
The  WB  could  work  with  other  international  agencies  and  countries  themselves  to  ensure  that 
household surveys are collected in the countries that currently have unsatisfactory or no data. In 
particular, efforts should be made to ensure that in-country capacity is developed to improve the 
collection,  analysis  and  dissemination  of  the  required  information  to  monitor  the  evolution  of 
poverty on a sustainable basis. The model for such an effort could be a combination of the WB’s 
LSMS (Living Standard Measurement Surveys) and MECOVI (a Spanish acronym for Improving 
Surveys  on  Living  Conditions  in  LAC).    The  latter--a  joint  project  of  the  Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), the WB and the UN Economic Commission for LAC (UNECLAC)-- 
was  launched  in  the  mid-nineties  and  had  remarkable  success  in  improving  the  availability  and 
quality of household surveys in LAC.  It also improved the in-country capacity to collect, analyze 
and  disseminate  surveys  throughout  the  region.    As  a  result,  LAC  now  has  one  of  the  most 
                                                 
19 Nevertheless, some countries are working to remove these barriers. Brazil, for example, has made household survey 
microdata available online for recent (since 2008) household surveys. 
20 This is consistent with one of the main recommendations of the “Deaton Commission.”  See Banerjee, Deaton, Lustig 
and Rogoff (2006).   12 
comprehensive databases to track progress on development indicators such as poverty, inequality 
and its determinants, labor market performance, access to education, health and social security.
21   
In the cases of inconsistencies among sources, the WB could take the lead in setting up a poverty 
data review process. In conjunction with other international and government agencies as well as 
independent researchers from the countries themselves, the WB should try to identify the source of 
discrepancies and clearly explain and document them.   
In addition, the WB may want to go one step further for the data that is produced by the WB 
and/or  published  under  its  institutional  logo.    For  that  purpose,  it  could  set  up  some  sort  of 
clearing-house to decide which information is the most robust to be used for a particular country at 
a  specific  point  in  time  and  why.  A  data  user  should  not  have  to  ponder  whether  to  rely  on 
PovcalNet,  World  Development  Indicators  or  Poverty  Assessments  (or  SEDLAC  for  Latin 
America) regarding poverty and inequality estimates. 
Assessing the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Poverty 
We know that in advanced countries the direct contribution (that is, without behavioral responses or 
general equilibrium effects) of net transfers to reducing post-fiscal inequality and poverty is quite 
substantial. For example, according to Lopez and Perry (2008, p. 18-19) and Goñi, Lopez and 
Serven (2008, p. 5, n. 14), post-fiscal income inequality in advanced countries is as much as 15 
percentage points lower than pre-fiscal income inequality.
22  DeFina and Thanawala (2004) show 
that the after net transfers headcount ratio, poverty gap and squared poverty gap in 17 advanced 
countries are, on average, 53,  73 and 81 percent lower, respectively, than before net transfers, and 
that a wide variation among countries exists especially for the headcount ratio. How effectively do 
governments in developing countries use their ability to collect and redistribute revenues to reduce 
poverty?  At present, information and analysis on the direct impact of fiscal policy on poverty is 
scarce, not comparable across countries or over time, and not systematized (i.e., not available in one 
location  and/or  in  a  user-friendly  format).  Given  the  pervasiveness  of  fiscal  policy  and  its 
                                                 
21 An example of the richness of information available in LAC can be found in SEDLAC (see 
http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/). 
22 The market income Gini for the Latin American countries in the sample was .52, and the disposable income Gini was 
.5; the market income Gini for European countries in the sample was .46 and the disposable income Gini was .31. This 
estimate includes monetary transfers and direct taxes only. In-kind transfers and indirect taxes, such as VAT, are not 
included in the analysis. The comparison should be viewed with certain caution since the market income inequality is 
quite likely endogenous to the existing transfer systems.  If pensions were not generous enough, for example, 
households which now portray zero or low market incomes would probably have higher levels of market incomes.   13 
importance in terms of impact, it would seem that institutions such as the WB could play a pivotal 
role in closing this knowledge gap. 
Net transfers (particularly monetary transfers), tended—at least until recently—to be considered as 
secondary in the fight against poverty in developing countries. In general, the consensus has been 
that  in  order  to  reduce  poverty  on  a  sustainable  basis,  it  is  better  to  rely  on  pro-poor  growth 
strategies.  Recent research, however, reveals that direct cash transfers (especially the well-known 
Conditional Cash Transfers, CCTs) can be quite powerful in reducing poverty (and inequality) on a 
large scale (Fiszbein and Schady et al., 2009; Lopez-Calva and Lustig, 2010). For example, Soares 
and Satyro (2009, p. 27, table 10) show that the CCT program Bolsa Familia reduced Brazil’s poverty 
gap and squared poverty gap by 18% and 22%, respectively, in 2006. Barros et al. (2010, p. 153, table 
6-6) show that 13% of the recent decline in income inequality in Brazil (as measured by the Gini 
coefficient) can be attributed to Bolsa Familia transfers, while the program’s budget is less than 0.5% 
of national income. Similar results have been found for Mexico’s large-scale CCT, Oportunidades. 
Fiszbein and Schady et al. (2009, p. 110, table 4.3) show that Oportunidades reduced the poverty gap 
and squared poverty gap by 19% and 29%, respectively, in 2004, while Scott (2008, p. 43, table 9) 
shows that it accounts for 18.8% of Mexico’s recent decline in income inequality. The impressive 
contribution of CCTs to poverty reduction is not limited to LAC; for example, an ex ante impact 
evaluation of Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino (a CCT in the Philippines) found that the program has 
the  potential  to  reduce  the  incidence,  depth  and  severity  of  poverty  by  31.1,  52.5  and  64.3%, 
respectively (Son and Florentino, 2008, p. 18, table 8).
 23 
In the last ten years there has been a technological innovation in social policy demonstrating that 
cash transfers to the poor on a very large scale (Brazil’s program reaches more than 50 million 
people  and  Mexico’s,  more  than  20  million)  are  feasible  and  relatively  inexpensive  (average 
administrative costs are 4% of total program budget for Bolsa Familia and 9% for Oportunidades 
(Fiszbein and Schady et al., 2009, p. 243, 269)). In addition to reducing poverty directly, CCTs have 
been shown to improve health (measured in terms of regular medical checkups, prenatal, natal and 
                                                 
23 The simulation performed by Son and Florentino (2008) includes multiple targeting possibilities (universal targeting, 
targeting only poor children, and geographic targeting), multiple transfer sizes, and two different transfer options: 
uniform, where the amount of the transfer does not change with the child’s age, and progressive, where the transfer 
increases by 5% per year to compensate for the increased opportunity cost of school attendance for older children. The 
numbers cited here assume the current program characteristics: targeting only poor children and a uniform transfer size 
of 300 pesos per child.   14 
postnatal care, vaccinations, body mass index, blood pressure and incidence of illness),
24 nutrition 
(measured in terms of quality of food consumed, birthweight and child growth)
25 and education 
(measured in terms of school attendance, enrollment and grade promotion),
26 which one hopes will 
help break the poverty cycle and reduce poverty in the future. The CCTs have also reduced poverty 
among  non-beneficiaries  in  their  local  communities  because  of  indirect  or  spillover  effects 
(Barrientos and Sabates-Wheeler, 2009; Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009). Learning about the revenue 
raising and spending patterns of developing countries’ governments can be very useful to assess 
whether there is fiscal space for such policies and, if not, why not and how it can be created. 
In light of the previous discussion, fiscal policy—cash transfers, in particular-- as a direct tool for 
poverty reduction should be given more prominence. Based on Lustig (2011), this paper outlines a 
diagnostic framework to assess how effective and efficient governments’ fiscal policies are at 
reducing poverty.  The Commitment to Equity Assessment (CEQ) is a diagnostic tool that quantifies and 
assesses the extent to which governments use revenue-raising and expenditure policies to reduce 
poverty and inequality in ways that are broadly consistent with macroeconomic stability, 
microeconomic efficiency and growth.
27 Based on the economics of the welfare state, CEQ evaluates 
public finance practices in individual countries in terms of four basic dimensions or criteria: 
resources, equity, quality and accountability. Do governments collect and allocate enough resources 
to support a minimum living standard for all? Do they collect and distribute resources equitably? Do 
they ensure spending is fiscally sustainable and that programs are incentive compatible? Do they 
collect and publish relevant information and are they subject to independent evaluations? For each 
criterion there are quantitative and qualitative indicators derived from poverty and inequality 
analysis, static fiscal incidence analysis
28 as well as best practices in macroeconomic management, 
program and policy design and evaluation, and accountability indicators.
29  
                                                 
24 See, for example, Lagarde, Haines and Palmer (2009), Lomeli (2008) and Fernald, Hou and Gertler (2008). 
25 See, for example, Attanasio and Mesnard (2006), Fernald, Gertler and Neufeld (2008) and Barber and Gertler (2008). 
26 See, for example, Glewwe and Kassouf (2010), de Brauw and Hoddinott (2010), Schady and Araujo (2008) and 
Maluccio and Flores (2005). 
27 Developed under the leadership of Nora Lustig, the CEQ is a joint project of the Inter-American Dialogue and 
Tulane University’s Center for Inter-American Policy and Research (CIPR) and Department of Economics. The CEQ 
has  received  generous  support  from  the  Canadian  International  Development  Agency,  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of 
Foreign Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme’s Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean 
and the General Electric Foundation. 
28 For the limitations of static incidence analysis see, for example, Bergh (2005). 
29 See, for example, Adema and Ladaique (2005),  Atkinson (1983), Bourguignon and Pereira da Silva (2003), Barr 
(2004), Barros et al. (2009), Birdsall, de la Torre and Menez (2008), Breceda, Rigolini and Saavedra (2008), Dilnot, Kay 
and Keen (1990), Fiszbein and Schady et al. (2009), Grosh et al. (2008),  Goñi, Lopez and Serven (2008), Kakwani   15 
In sum, 
CEQ consists of a diagnostic framework which helps identify the main causes and constraints 
(successful fiscal interventions) that prevent a country from achieving (enable a country to achieve) a 
universal minimum standard of living and reductions in inequality in ways that are consistent with 
macroeconomic and microeconomic efficiency.  A diagnostic framework follows a logical sequence 
to identify or discard factors that may be a. obstacles or crucial to achieving a particular objective or 
b. essential to understanding a specific phenomenon.  Diagnostic exercises usually rely on a 
combination of predictions from theory, rigorous empirical evidence, practical knowledge and what 
we call “common sense.”  The diagnostic approach has been widely used to identify the binding 
constraints for economic growth (Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2006), Rodrik (2007) and 
Hausmann, Klinger and Wagner (2008)).  CEQ is one of the first attempts to apply it to a social 
equity goal. (Lustig, 2011) 
 
CEQ confines its assessment of government efforts to fiscal policy (also called fiscal or budgetary 
interventions).
30  CEQ’s main purpose is to inform governments of how their public finances affect 
their  equity  goals,  recommend  practical  measures,  and  enhance  accountability  and  transparency 
through better  data  collection  and  evaluation  systems.
31  In  the  case  of  HIPCs  and  very  poor 
countries more broadly, CEQ contributes to inform donors on the orders of magnitude of resource 
shortfalls to achieve certain goals (for example, reducing poverty by half and universal coverage of 
primary education) as well as on the actual use and ability of foreign aid to help achieve these goals.  
CEQ  could  inform  donors,  for  example,  who  is  actually  benefiting  from  the  larger  resource 
envelope  made  available  to  the  country.  Of  course,  CEQ  can  be  used  for  other  purposes:  for 
example,  participatory  budgeting  processes  and  non-governmental  social  observatories.  In  the 
future,  it  will  also  be  used  to  construct  a  Commitment  to  Equity  Index  to  rank  countries  and 
monitor their performance over time.
32 
CEQ takes the form of a questionnaire whose theoretical underpinning can be found in economics 
of  the  welfare  state  and  the  criteria-based  approach.
33  The  answers  to  the  questionnaire  use 
indicators from standard poverty and inequality analysis, fiscal incidence analysis and public finance.  
It uses static incidence analysis; it does not include behavioral responses or general equilibrium 
                                                                                                                                                           
(1977), Lambert (2002), Lora (2006), Morra Imas and Rist (2009), Lustig (2000), Shah (2003), Suits (1977), van de Walle 
and Nead (1995), World Bank (2000/2001, 2006). 
30 Depending on the country, “transfers” may include some producer subsidies, especially in agriculture. More precise 
definitions can be found in Lustig (2011). 
31 The CEQ assesses efforts and not outcomes. The CEQ can be viewed as a complement to ongoing initiatives such as 
the World Bank’s biennial Human Opportunity Index (Barros et al., 2009), UNDP’s Human Development Index and the UN’s 
MDGs Monitoring. 
32 Also a joint initiative of the Inter-American Dialogue and Tulane University’s Center for Inter-American Policy and 
Research (CIPR), the construction of such an index is under way. 
33 For details on the criteria-based approach see Lustig (2011).   16 
effects. To construct the indicators, CEQ uses experimental approaches in areas not well developed 
in  the  literature  (e.g.,  to  estimate  resources  required  to  close  poverty  gaps  caused  by  systemic 
shocks).  The  data  requirements  are  mainly  two:  household  income-expenditure  surveys 
(expenditures and self-consumption data are important to assess the impact of indirect subsidies and 
taxes) and detailed public sector accounts (at the federal and, if appropriate, state and local levels). In 
addition, CEQ uses the existing knowledge on efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the tax-and-
transfer system.   
Details  on  CEQ,  the  full  questionnaire  and  results  from  applying  CEQ  to  two  middle-income 
countries (Argentina and Mexico) can be found in Lustig (2011) and Lustig, Pessino and Scott 
(2011),  respectively.  Here  we  present  a  summary  of  the  diagnostic  process  in Figure  6.    In  a 
nutshell, CEQ starts out by selecting the goals (indicators) we want to use for the assessment.  For 
example, in middle-income countries we want to check whether governments are able to reduce 
post-fiscal extreme poverty as much as advanced countries and whether they are able to provide 
access to basic education and health services to the universe of the poor. In the case of HIPCs or 
other low-income countries, we may want to check whether governments are able to reduce poverty 
in  ways  consistent  with  MDGs.  17 
 
Figure 6. Commitment to Equity Assessments (CEQ) Diagnostic Tree 
 
Source: Lustig (2011). 
Once  we  can  establish  whether  the  goals  are  achieved  for  a  particular  country,  the  diagnostic 
exercise begins.  In general, we will find that the goals are not achieved.  The question is why not?  Is 
it for lack of fiscal resources? If the answer is yes, is it because the country is too poor or effort to 
raise  revenues  is  sub-par?  If  effort  to  raise  revenues  is  sub-par,  what  are  the  causes:  political 
economy dynamics, institutional ineffectiveness, etc.?  Even if the government collects sufficient 
resources, is what is left for redistributive purposes sufficient to achieve the goals? If no, what are 
the causes: large debt payments, military spending, overblown bureaucracies, corruption, etc.?  If yes 
(the government does collect sufficient resources), why are the goals not achieved?  Is it because 
redistributive resources are not collected or distributed in equitable forms: that is, a large proportion 
of the net transfers accrues to the non-poor? If the latter is the case, is it so by design (for example,   18 
subsidies  to  goods  and  services—e.g.,  gasoline  or  tertiary  education—that  accrue  in  larger 
proportion to the non-poor)? Or, are true errors of exclusion at fault? Other factors that may be 
preventing the goals from being achieved are that the coverage of programs and policies is not 
universal among the poor and/or the size of the net transfers to the poor falls short.  In turn, these 
causes could be a result of the design of net transfers: for example, government programs may 
purposefully exclude undocumented immigrants or able-bodied adult men. Or, they could be the 
result of unintended errors of inclusion.  
At the end of the diagnostic exercise, one will be able to identify whether the heart of the problem 
lies in: 1. the scarcity of aggregate fiscal resources; 2. the way the latter are allocated by function; 3. 
the way they are collected/allocated between the poor and the non-poor (or, more broadly among 
different socio-economic groups) and which policies and programs are the main “culprits”; and/or 
4. gaps in the range of policies and programs or problems with their implementation which result in 
insufficient  coverage  of  the  poor  or  insufficient  resources  allocated  to  them.    In  addition,  the 
application of CEQ will permit us to assess whether the policies are, broadly speaking, sustainable 
from  a  macroeconomic  point  of  view  and  incentive  compatible  and  cost-effective  from  a 
microeconomic point of view.  In addition, we will be able to determine whether policies and 
programs  are  carried  out  with  the  transparency  and  accountability  that  is  desirable  to  establish 
effective governance. 
The Commitment to Equity Assessments could be done as stand-alone exercises or integrated to 
Poverty Assessments, Public Expenditure Reviews or the PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) 
processes.  Having such assessments will help focus the attention on the areas in which governments 
are performing well and poorly in terms of their commitment to reduce poverty through fiscal 
policy. Given the potential for fiscal policy to substantially reduce poverty, the assessments will also 
be of immense value for policy decisions.   19 
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